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Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and 
Melissa Osborne Groves 
Intergenerational Inequality Matters 
Citizens of modern democratic societies hold strongly meritocratic val­
ues. Equal opportunity for educational and occupational advancement 
can and should ensure that each child have a fair chance of economic 
success. At the same time, parents have the right and the duty to prepare 
their children as best they can for a secure economic future. These two 
values  may  conﬂict,  but  a  moderate  positive  correlation  between  the 
economic success of parents and children is arguably compatible with 
both, since this may be interpreted as a sign that most parents are pre­
paring their children well, and that only a small minority are exception­
ally advantaged or disadvantaged. 
As amply documented in this volume, however, there are quite strong 
tendencies for children of those at the bottom of the income distribution 
to ﬁnd their children at the bottom, with a parallel tendency for those 
at the top of the income distribution to ﬁnd their children also at the 
top. (see ﬁgure I.1). 
Many will read the data provided in this and succeeding chapters and 
conclude, with us, that children from the least well-off families do not 
have a fair chance at attaining the level of economic security most other 
families manage to attain. This book not only analyzes the extent of 
economic mobility. It equally seeks to uncover the factors accounting 
for the success of some families (and the failure of others’) attempts to 
ensure their children an auspicious economic future. Much of what we 
have learned through this research makes us optimistic concerning the 
power of social policy to enhance equality of opportunity. For instance, 
we ﬁnd that little intergenerational inequality is due to parents passing 
superior IQ on to their children, and much is due to parents passing 
their material wealth to their children, at least for those at the top of 
the income distribution. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that children may 
well inherit genetically based behavioral characteristics that strongly af­
fect their labor market success, though the extent of this aspect of the 
intergenerational transmission process cannot be estimated with much 
precision, and we are just beginning to ﬁnd out what those characteris­
tics are. While the evidence for a genetic aspect of the intergenerational 2 
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Figure  I.1  Probability  of  offspring  attaining  given  income  decile,  by  parents’ 
income deciles, United States. Based on total family income for black and white 
participants in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics who were born between 
1942 and 1972, and their parents. The income of the children was measured 
when  they  were  aged  26  or  older,  and  was  averaged  over  all  such  years  for 
which it was observed. The number of years of income data ranged from 1 to 
29 with an average of 11.5; the median year of observation was 1991. Parents’ 
income was averaged over all observed years in which the child lived with the 
parents.  The  number  of  years  of  income  data  ranged  from  1  to  27  with  an 
average  of  11.9;  the  median  year  of  observation  was  1974.  The  simple  age-
adjusted correlation  of parents’  and children’s  incomes in  the data set  repre­
sented in the ﬁgure is 0.42. 
Source: Hertz, this volume. 
transmission process is suggestive, a major role for the environmental 
inﬂuences of family, neighborhood, and schooling is beyond a doubt. 
However, conventional measures of schooling attainment do not capture 
key aspects of this process. 
Better Data, New Conclusions 
For many years, the consensus among economists was that in the United 
States, one’s income is only very weakly dependent upon the economic 
success of one’s parents.
1 3  INTRODUCTION 
Early  research  on  the  statistical  relationship  between  parents’  and 
their  children’s  economic  status  after  becoming  adults,  starting  with 
Blau and Duncan (1967), found only a weak connection. For example, 
the simple correlations between parents’ and sons’ income or earnings 
(or their logarithms) in the United States reported by Becker and Tomes 
(1986) averaged 0.15. Becker (1988) expressed a widely held consensus 
when, in his presidential address to the American Economics Associa­
tion, he concluded, “[L]ow earnings as well as high earnings are not 
strongly transmitted from fathers to sons.” (10) 
More recent research, some of which is presented in this volume, dem­
onstrates that the estimates of high levels of intergenerational mobility 
were artifacts of two types of measurement error: mistakes in reporting 
income, particularly when individuals were asked to recall the income 
of their parents, and transitory components in current income uncorre­
lated with underlying permanent income (Bowles 1972; Bowles and Nel­
son 1974; Atkinson et al. 1983; Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992). The 
high noise-to-signal ratio in both generations’ incomes depressed the in­
tergenerational correlation. As Bhashkar Mazumder shows in chapter 2, 
when corrected for these two types of measurement error, the intergener­
ational correlations for economic status appear to be substantial, many 
of them three times the average of the U. S. studies surveyed by Becker 
and Tomes (1986). 
The higher consensus estimates of the intergenerational transmission 
of economic success has stimulated empirical research. The relevant facts 
on which most researchers now agree include the following: brothers’ 
incomes are much more similar than those of randomly chosen males of 
the same race and similar age differences; the incomes of identical twins 
are much more similar than fraternal twins or non-twin brothers; the 
children of well-off parents obtain more and higher-quality schooling; 
and wealth inheritance makes an important contribution to the wealth 
owned by the offspring of the very rich. On the basis of these and other 
empirical regularities, it seems safe to conclude that the intergenerational 
transmission  of  economic  status  is  accounted  for  by  a  heterogeneous 
collection of mechanisms, including the genetic and cultural transmis­
sion of cognitive skills and noncognitive personality traits in demand 
by employers (see Melissa Osborne Groves’s contribution, chapter 7), 
the  inheritance  of  wealth  and  income-enhancing  group  memberships 
such as race (see Thomas Hertz’s contribution, chapter 5), and the supe­
rior education and health status enjoyed by the children of higher-status 
families. 
The  transmission of  economic  success  across generations,  however, 
remains something of a black box. Basing our arguments on the consoli­
dation of several data sets, we report in this introduction that the com­4  INTRODUCTION 
bined inheritance processes operating through superior cognitive perfor­
mance and educational attainments of those with well-off parents, while 
important, explain at most half of the intergenerational transmission of 
income.  Moreover,  while  genetic  transmission  of  earnings-enhancing 
traits appears to play a role, the genetic transmission of IQ appears to 
be surprisingly unimportant. 
It might be thought that the relative unimportance of IQ in intergener­
ational inequality is an artifact of poor measurement of the intervening 
variables relative to the measurement of the income or earnings of par­
ents  and  offspring.  But  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  case.  Years  of 
schooling and other measures of school attainment, like cognitive per­
formance, are measured with relatively little error. Better measurements 
will of course help; but we are not likely to improve much on our mea­
sures  of  IQ,  and  recent  improvements  in  the  measurement  of  school 
quality have not offered much additional illumination. Our weakness in 
accounting for intergenerational economic status transmission is not due 
to measuring the right variables poorly, but to missing some of the im­
portant variables entirely. What might these be? 
Most economic models treat one’s income as the sum of the returns 
to  the  factors  of  production  one  brings  to  the  market,  like  cognitive 
functioning and education. But any individual trait that affects income 
and for which parent-offspring similarity is strong will contribute to the 
intergenerational transmission of economic success. Included are race, 
geographical location, height, beauty or other aspects of physical  ap­
pearance, health status, and some aspects of personality. Thus, by con­
trast  to  the  standard  approach,  we  give  considerable  attention  to  in­
come-generating characteristics that are not generally considered to be 
factors of production. 
In studies of the intergenerational transmission of economic status, 
our  estimates  suggest  that  cognitive  skills  and  education  have  been 
overstudied, while wealth, race, and noncognitive behavioral traits have 
been  understudied.  As  a  partial  corrective,  in  chapter  7,  Melissa  Os­
borne Groves includes explicit personality variables in modeling inter-
generational status transmission. Using the National Longitudinal Sur­
veys,  she  ﬁnds that the inclusion  of personality accounts  for a larger 
component of the intergenerational transmission process than measured 
IQ. Adding a single personality variable—fatalism—reduces the unex­
plained persistence of earnings by more than four percentage points— 
more than twice that of cognitive performance. In addition, the trans­
mission of personality contributes to the transmission of earnings be­
tween father and son, comparable to estimates of the portion attributed 
to the inheritance of IQ. 5  INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 1, Greg Duncan, Ariel Kalil, Susan Mayer, Robin Tepper, 
and Monique Payne describe the extent of resemblance between parents 
and children and attempt to account for resemblances with traditional 
measures  of  family  background  such  as  socioeconomic  status,  educa­
tional level, and even general parenting skills. On the basis of two data 
sets containing seventeen detailed measures of parental behavioral char­
acteristics measured in adolescence and the same characteristics of their 
children, they ﬁnd that parents pass on speciﬁc rather than general com­
petencies to their  children. Family background and  parenting explain 
only a small part of intergenerational correlations. It follows that disag­
gregation of individual behavioral characteristics may signiﬁcantly im­
prove our understanding of intergenerational status transmission. 
Measuring the Intergenerational Transmission 
of Economic Status 
Economic status can be measured in discrete categories—by member­
ship in hierarchically ordered classes, for example—or continuously, by 
earnings, income, or wealth. The discrete approach can allow a rich but 
difﬁcult-to-summarize representation of the process of intergenerational 
persistence of status using transition probabilities among the relevant 
social ranks (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). By contrast, continuous 
measures allow a simple metric of persistence, based on the correlation 
between the economic status of the two generations. Moreover, these 
correlations may be decomposed into additive components reﬂecting the 
various causal mechanisms accounting for parent-child economic simi­
larity. Both approaches are insightful, but for simplicity of presentation 
we rely primarily on the continuous measurement of status. For reasons 
of data availability, we use income or earnings as the measure of eco­
nomic status, though income (the more inclusive measure) is preferable 
for most applications. We use subscript p to refer to parental measures, 
while y is an individual’s economic status, adjusted so that its mean, y ¯, 
is constant across generations, βy  is a constant, and εy  is a disturbance 
uncorrelated with yp. Thus 
y − y ¯ =β y(yp − y ¯) +ε y;  (1) 
that is, the deviation of the offspring’s economic status from the mean 
is βy times the deviation of the parent from mean economic status, plus 
an error term. The coefﬁcient βy is a measure of intergenerational income 
persistence.  In  the  empirical  work  reviewed  below,  earnings,  income, 
wealth, and other measures of economic success are measured by their 6  INTRODUCTION 
natural  logarithm  unless  otherwise  noted.  Thus,  βy  is  the  percentage 
change in offspring’s economic success associated with a 1 percent change 
in parents’ economic success. The inﬂuence of mean economic status on 
the  economic  status  of  the  offspring,  1-βy,i s  called  regression  to  the 
mean, since it shows that one may expect to be closer to the mean than 
one’s parents by the fraction 1-βy (Goldberger 1989). 
The relationship between the intergenerational income elasticity, βy, 





where σy  is the standard deviation of y. If y is the natural logarithm of 
wealth, income, or earnings, its standard deviation is a common unit-
free measure of inequality. Thus, if inequality is unchanging across gen­
erations, so σy =σ y, then ρy =β y. However, the intergenerational income 
p
elasticity exceeds ρy  when income inequality is rising, but is less than 
ρy  when income inequality is declining. In effect, the intergenerational 
correlation coefﬁcient ρ is affected by changes in the distribution of in­
come while the intergenerational income elasticity is not. Also, ρ
2  mea­
sures the fraction of the variance in this generation’s measure of eco­
nomic success that is linearly associated with the same measure in the 
previous generation. 
Estimates of the intergenerational income elasticity are presented in 
Mulligan (1997), Solon (1999), and Harding et al. (this volume). The 
mean estimates reported in Mulligan are as follows: for consumption 
0.68, for wealth 0.50, for income 0.43, for earnings (or wages) 0.34, and 
for years of schooling 0.29. Evidence concerning trends in the degree of 
income persistence across generations is mixed. Most studies indicate 
that persistence rises with age, is greater for sons than daughters, and is 
greater when multiple years of income or earnings are averaged. The 
importance of averaging multiple years to capture permanent aspects of 
economic status is dramatized in Mazumder’s contribution to this vol­
ume (chapter 2). Mazumder used a rich U.S. Social Security Administra­
tion data set to estimate an intergenerational income elasticity of 0.27 
averaging a son’s earnings over four years and a father’s earnings aver­
aged over two years. But the estimate increases to 0.47 when seven years 
of the fathers earnings are averaged, and to 0.65 when sixteen years are 
averaged. 
Do intergenerational elasticities of this magnitude mean that rags to 
riches is no more than a fantasy for most poor children? The intergener­
ational correlation is an average measure, and may be unilluminating 
about  the  probabilities  of  economic  success  conditional  on  being  the 7  INTRODUCTION 
child of poor, rich, or middling parents. Calculating these conditional 
probabilities  and  inspecting  the  entire  transition  matrix  gives  a  more 
complete picture. The results of a study by Tom Hertz, reported in chap­
ter 5, appear in ﬁgure I.1, with the adult children arranged by income 
decile (from poor to rich, moving from left to right) and with parents 
arranged by income decile along the other axis. The height of the surface 
indicates the likelihood of making the transition from the indicated par­
ents’ decile to the children’s decile. 
Though the underlying intergenerational correlation of incomes in the 
data set that Hertz used is a modest 0.42, the differences in the likely 
life trajectories of the children of the poor and the rich are substantial. 
The “twin peaks” represent those stuck in poverty and afﬂuence (though 
we do not expect the term “afﬂuence trap” to catch on). A child born 
to the top decile has a 29.6 percent chance of attaining the top decile 
(point  D)  and  a  43.3  percent  chance  of  attaining  the  top  quintile.  A 
indicates that the child of the poorest decile has a 1.3 percent chance of 
attaining the top decile, and a 4.3 percent chance of attaining the top 
quintile. C indicates that children of the poorest decile have a 31.5 per­
cent chance of occupying the lowest decile, and a 51.3 percent chance 
of occupying the lowest quintile, while B shows that the child of the 
richest decile has a 1.5 percent chance of ending in the poorest decile, 
and a 3.5 percent chance of occupying the lowest quintile. 
Mobility patterns differ dramatically by race, as reported by Hertz in 
chapter 5. In particular, the rate of persistence in the bottom decile, a 
measure of the severity of the intergenerational poverty trap, is much 
higher for blacks than for whites. Other studies (Corak and Heisz 1999; 
Cooper et al. 1994) also suggest that distinct transmission mechanisms 
may be at work at various points of the income distribution. For exam­
ple, wealth bequests may play a major role at the top of the income 
distribution, while at the bottom, vulnerability to violence or other ad­
verse health episodes may be more important. 
Sources of Persistence: Cultural, Genetic, and Bequest 
Economic status does persist substantially across generations. We seek 
to uncover the channels through which parental incomes inﬂuence off­
spring incomes. We do this by decomposing the intergenerational corre­
lation (or the intergenerational income elasticity) into additive compo­
nents reﬂecting the contribution of various causal mechanisms. This will 
allow us to conclude, for example, that a certain fraction of the intergen­
erational correlation is accounted for by the genetic inheritance of IQ, 
or by the fact that the children of wealthy parents are also wealthy. 8  INTRODUCTION 
It is a remarkable fact about correlation coefﬁcients that this can be 
done. Moreover, the technique we use does not require that we intro­
duce  variables  in  any  particular  order.  Suppose  that  parents’  income 
(measured by its logarithm, yp) and offspring education (s) affect off­
spring income (also measured by its logarithm, y). Like any correlation 
coefﬁcient, this intergenerational correlation ry y can be expressed as the 
p
sum of the normalized regression coefﬁcients of measures of parental 
income  βy y  and  offspring  education  βys  in  a  multiple  regression  pre­
p
dicting y, each multiplied by the correlation between yp and the regressor 
(which, of course, for parental income itself is 1). The normalized regres­
sion coefﬁcient is the change in the dependent variable, in standard de­
viation units, associated with a one standard deviation change in the 
independent variable. The direct effect is the normalized regression coef­
ﬁcient of parental income from this regression. The education compo­
nent of this decomposition of the intergenerational correlation is called 
an indirect effect. Figure I.2 illustrates this breakdown,
2 which gives 
ryy =β y y + ry sβys. 
p p p 
As long as the multiple regression coefﬁcients are unbiased, the de­
composition is valid whatever the relationship among the variables. Spe­
ciﬁcally,  it  does  not  require  that  the  regressors  be  uncorrelated.  This 
decomposition  allows  us  to  be  more  precise  about  our  “black  box” 
claim. When we reported that the standard schooling, cognitive level, 
and other variables account for less than half of the observed parent 
offspring similarity of income, for instance, we mean that the direct pa­
rental effect is least half of the intergenerational correlation in a number 
of studies allowing this comparison (Bowles 1972; Bowles and Nelson 
1974; Atkinson et al. 1983; Mulligan 1997). 
Our strategy is to estimate the size of these direct and indirect effects. 







Figure I.2  Representing a correlation as the sum of direct and indirect effects. 9  INTRODUCTION 
and other variables—schooling, in the example—thought to be causally 
related to the income-generating process. These correlations with paren­
tal income need not, of course, reﬂect causal relationships. But the above 
decomposition can be repeated for the correlations between parental in­
come  and  the  causes  of  offspring  income,  in  some  cases  permitting 
causal interpretations. For example, a study of the role of wealth in the 
transmission  process  could  ask  why  parental  income  and  offspring 
wealth are correlated. Is it bequests and inter vivos transfers or the cul­
tural transmission of savings behaviors that account for this correlation? 
Or do we simply not know why parent and offspring wealth is corre­
lated, and as a result should avoid giving the data a causal interpreta­
tion? Likewise, parent-offspring similarity in human capital may be due 
to  genetic  or  cultural  inheritance  of  whatever  it  takes  to  persist  in 
schooling and to acquire skills and behaviors that are rewarded in the 
labor market. Unlike models of parental and child behavior that account 
for persistence, pioneered by Becker and elaborated by Graw and Mulli­
gan (2002), our approach is more diagnostic, not giving an adequate 
causal account of the transmission process, but indicating where to look 
to ﬁnd the causes. The next sections will explore such decompositions. 
The Role of Genetic Inheritance of Cognitive Skill 
One  of  the  transmission  channels  deserves  special  attention  not  only 
because of its prima facie plausibility, but also because of the extraordi­
nary attention given to it in popular discussions of the subject. This is 
the genetic inheritance of cognitive skill. The similarity of parents’ and 
offspring’s scores on cognitive tests is well documented. Correlations of 
IQ between parents and offspring range from 0.42 to 0.72, where the 
higher ﬁgure refers to measures of average parental vs. average offspring 
IQ (Bouchard and McGue 1981; Plomin et al. 2000). The contribution 
of cognitive functioning to earnings both directly and via schooling at­
tainment has also been established in a variety of studies that estimate 
determinants of earnings using IQ (and related) test scores. The direct 
effect of IQ on earnings is estimated from multiple regression studies 
that typically use the logarithm of earnings as a dependent variable, and 
that estimate the regression coefﬁcients of a variety of explanatory vari­
ables,  including  performance  on  a  cognitive  test,  years  (and  perhaps 
other measures) of schooling, a measure of parental economic and / or 
social status, work experience, race, and sex. The indirect effect of IQ 
operating through its contribution to higher levels of educational attain­
ment  is  estimated  using  measures  of  childhood  IQ  (along  with  other 
variables) to predict the level of schooling obtained. 10  INTRODUCTION 
We have located sixty-ﬁve estimates of the normalized regression coef­
ﬁcient of a test score in an earnings equation in twenty-four different 
studies of U.S. data over a period of three decades. Our meta-analysis 
of these studies is presented in Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001b). 
The mean of these estimates is 0.15, indicating that a standard deviation 
change in the cognitive score, holding constant the remaining variables 
(including  schooling),  changes  the  natural  logarithm  of  earnings  by 
about one-seventh of a standard deviation. By contrast, the mean value 
of the normalized regression coefﬁcient of years of schooling in the same 
equation predicting the natural log of earnings in these studies is 0.22, 
suggesting a somewhat larger independent effect of schooling. We checked 
to see if these results were dependent on the weight of overrepresented 
authors, the type of cognitive test used, at what age the test was taken, 
and other differences among the studies, and we found no signiﬁcant 
effects. An estimate of the causal impact of childhood IQ on years of 
schooling (also normalized) is 0.53 (Winship and Korenman 1999). A 
rough estimate of the direct and indirect effect of IQ on earnings, call it 
b, is then b = 0.15 + (0.53)(0.22) = 0.266. 
Do these two facts—parent-child similarity in IQ and an important 
direct and indirect causal role for IQ in generating earnings—imply a 
major role for genetic inheritance of cognitive ability in the transmission 
of intergenerational economic status? One way to formulate this ques­
tion is to ask how similar would parental and offspring IQ be if the sole 
source  of  the  similarity  were  genetic  transmission.  Also,  how  similar 
would the incomes of parents and offspring be if there were no other 
transmission channel? 
For this we need some insights into genetics (the details are in the 
appendix  and  in  Bowles  and  Gintis  [2002]),  and  a  few  terms— 
phenotype, genotype, heritability, and the genetic correlation.A  person’s 
IQ—meaning, a test score—is a phenotypic trait, while the genes inﬂu­
encing IQ are the person’s genotypic IQ. Heritability is the relationship 
between  the  two.  Suppose  that,  for  a  given  environment,  a  standard 
deviation difference in genotype is associated with a fraction h of a stan­
dard deviation difference in IQ. Then h
2  is the heritability of IQ. Esti­
mates of h
2  are based on the degree of similarity of IQ among twins, 
siblings, cousins, and others with differing degrees of genetic relatedness. 
The value cannot be higher than 1, and most recent estimates are sub­
stantially lower, possibly more like a half or less (Devlin et al. 1997; 
Feldman et al. 2000; Plomin 1999). The genetic correlation is the degree 
of  statistical  association  between  genotypes  of  parents  and  children, 
which is 0.5 if the parents’ genotypes are uncorrelated (random mating). 
But couples tend to be more similar in IQ than would occur by random 
mate choice (assortative mating), and this similarity is associated with 11  INTRODUCTION 
an unknown correlation m of their genotypes. The effect is to raise the 
genetic correlation of parent and offspring to (1 + m)/2. 
Using the above method of decomposition, the correlation γ between 
parental and offspring IQ that is attributable to genetic inheritance of 
IQ  alone  is  the  heritability  of  IQ  times  the  genetic  correlation.  Thus 
we have γ=h
2(1 + m)/2. The correlation between parent and offspring 
income attributable to genetic inheritance of IQ is simply this correla­
tion, times the normalized effect of IQ on the income of parents, times 
the analogous effect for the offspring, or γb
2. Another way to see this is 
to note that the correlation between parental income and offspring IQ, 
which we would observe were the genetic inheritance of IQ the only 
channel at work, is γb, and this times the effect of offspring IQ on earn­
ings, which is b, gives the same result. 
Using the values previously estimated, we see that the contribution of 
genetic inheritance of IQ to the intergenerational transmission of income 
is  (h
2(1 + m)/2)(0.266)
2 = .035(1 + m)h
2.I f  the  heritability  of  IQ  were 
0.5 and the degree of assortation, m, were 0.2 (both reasonable, if only 
ball park estimates), and if the genetic inheritance of IQ were the only 
mechanism accounting for intergenerational income transmission, then 
the intergenerational correlation would be 0.01, or roughly 2 percent 
the observed intergenerational correlation. Note the conclusion that the 
contribution of genetic inheritance of IQ is negligible is not the result of 
any assumptions concerning assortative mating or the heritability of IQ: 
the IQ genotype of parents could be perfectly correlated and the herita­
bility of IQ 100 percent without appreciably changing the qualitative 
conclusions. The estimate results from the fact that IQ is just not an 
important enough determinant of economic success. 
Might the small contribution of genetic inheritance of IQ to parent-
offspring similarity of incomes be the result of measurement error in the 
cognitive measures? There are two issues here. First, what is the reliabil­
ity of the test: whatever the test measures, does it measure well? Second, 
what is the validity of the test: does the test measure the right thing? 
The concern that the tests are a very noisy measure is misplaced. In fact, 
the tests are among the more reliable variables used in standard earnings 
equations (reliability is measured by the correlation between tests and 
retests, between odd and even numbered items on the tests, and by more 
sophisticated methods). For the commonly used Armed Forces Qualiﬁ­
cation Test (AFQT), for example—a test used to predict vocational suc­
cess that is often used as a measure of cognitive skills—the correlation 
between two test scores taken on successive days by the same person is 
likely to be higher than the correlation between the same person’s re­
ported years of schooling or income on two successive days. 
The second concern, that the tests measure the wrong thing, is weight­12  INTRODUCTION 
ier and less easy to address with any certainty. Could it be that cognitive 
skills not measured on existing test instruments are both highly heritable 
and  have  a  major  impact  on  earnings,  thereby  possibly  explaining  a 
more substantial fraction of the transmission process? The search for 
general cognitive measures that are substantially uncorrelated with IQ 
and predictive of success in adult roles began with Edward Thorndike’s 
(1919) paper on “social intelligence.” Some alternative test instruments, 
such  as  Robert  Sternberg  and  collaborators’  “practical  intelligence” 
(Sternberg et al. 1995; Williams and Sternberg 1995) predict economic 
success in particular occupations. But despite the substantial fame and 
fortune that would have accrued to success in this area, the quest that 
Thorndike launched three generations ago has yielded no robust alter­
native to IQ, let alone one that is highly heritable. Thus, the possible 
existence  of  economically  important  but  as  yet  unmeasured  heritable 
general cognitive skills cannot be excluded, but should at this stage be 
treated as somewhat wishful speculation. 
Indeed, we are inclined to think that available estimates overstate the 
importance of general cognitive skill as a determinant of earnings, since 
in many respects taking a test is like doing a job. Successful performance 
in either case results from a combination of ability and motivation, in­
cluding the disposition to follow instructions, persistence, work ethic, 
and  other  traits  likely  to  contribute  independently  to  one’s  earnings. 
This is the reason we eschew the common label of a test score as “cogni­
tive skill” but rather use the more descriptive term “cognitive perfor­
mance.” Eysenck (1994, 9), a leading student of cognitive testing, writes, 
“Low problem solving in an IQ test is a measure of performance; per­
sonality may inﬂuence performance rather than abstract intellect, with 
measurable effects on the IQ. An IQ test lasts for up to 1 hour or more, 
and considerations of fatigue, vigilance, arousal, etc. may very well play 
a part.” Thus some of the explanatory power of the cognitive measure 
in predicting earnings does not reﬂect cognitive skill but rather other 
individual attributes contributing to the successful performance of tasks. 
Genetic and Environmental Inheritance 
Although the genetic inheritance of IQ explains little of the intergenera­
tional transmission process, this does not rule out the possible impor­
tance of other genetically transmitted traits. Indeed, the remarkable in­
come similarity of identical twins compared to fraternal twins suggests 
that genetic effects may be important. We will use the similarity of twins 
to estimate the genetic heritability of income as well as the environmen­
tal component of intergenerational transmission. 13  INTRODUCTION 
But two words of caution are in order. First, as we will demonstrate, 
our estimates are quite sensitive to variations in unobserved parameters. 
Second, it is sometimes mistakenly supposed that if the heritability of a 
trait is substantial, then the trait cannot be affected much by changing 
the environment. The fallacy of this view is dramatized by the case of 
stature. The heritability of height estimated from U.S.-twin samples is 
substantial  (about  0.90,  according  to  Plomin  et  al.  2000).  Moreover 
there are signiﬁcant height differences among the peoples of the world: 
Dinka men in the Sudan average 5 feet and 11 inches—a bit taller than 
Norwegian and U.S. military servicemen and a whopping 8 inches taller 
than the Hadza hunter-gatherers in Southern Africa (Floud et al. 1990). 
But the fact that Norwegian recruits in 1761 were shorter than today’s 
Hadza shows that even quite heritable traits are sensitive to environ­
ments. What can be concluded from a ﬁnding that a small fraction of 
the variance of a trait is due to environmental variance is that policies 
to alter the trait through changed environments will require nonstandard 
environments that differ from the environmental variance on which the 
estimates are based. 
Consider the  case of South Africa,  where in 1993  (the year before 
Nelson Mandela became president) roughly two-thirds of the intergener­
ational transmission of earnings was attributable to the fact that fathers 
and sons are of the same race, and race is a strong predictor of earnings 
(Hertz, 2001). That is, adding race to an equation predicting sons’ earn­
ings reduces the estimated effect of fathers’ earnings by over two thirds. 
Because the physical traits designated by “race” are highly heritable and 
interracial parenting uncommon, we ﬁnd a substantial role of genetic 
inheritance  in  the  intergenerational  transmission  of  economic  status. 
Yet, it is especially clear in the case of South Africa under apartheid that 
the economic importance of the genetic inheritance of physical traits was 
derived from environmental inﬂuences. What made the genetic inheri­
tance of skin color and other racial markers central to the transmission 
process were matters of public policy, not human nature, including the 
very deﬁnition of races, racial patterns in marriage, and the discrimina­
tion suffered by nonwhites. Thus, the determination of the genetic com­
ponent in a transmission process says little by itself about the extent to 
which public policy can level a playing ﬁeld. 
Our  estimates  of  heritability  use  data  on  pairs  of  individuals  with 
varying degrees of shared genes and environments. For example, identi­
cal and fraternal twins are exposed to similar environments during their 
upbringing but fraternal twins are less closely related genetically than 
identical twins. Under quite strong simplifying assumptions (explained 
in the appendix to Bowles and Gintis 2002), one can exploit the varia­
tion in genetic and environmental similarities among pairs of relatives 14  INTRODUCTION 
to  estimate  heritability  of  a  trait  such  as  income,  years  of  schooling, 
or  other  standard  economic  variables.  Taubman  (1976)  was  the  ﬁrst 
economist to use this method. The model underlying the following cal­
culations  assumes  that  genes  and  environment  affect  human  capital, 
which produces earnings, as the equation below indicates, but the effects 
of wealth and other contributions to income are unaffected by genes and 
environment, and will be introduced subsequently. 
Here are the assumptions. First, genes and environments have additive 
effects—genes and environment may be correlated, but the direct effect 
of “good genes” on earnings (its regression coefﬁcient) is independent 
of the quality of the environment, and conversely. Thus an individual’s 
earnings can be written 
earnings = h(genes) +β (environment) + idiosyncratic effects. 
Second, within-pair genetic differences (for the fraternals) are uncorre­
lated with within-pair environmental differences (for example, the good-
looking twin does not get more loving attention). Third, the environ­
ments affecting individual development are as similar for members of 
fraternal sets of twins as for the identical sets. Fourth, the earnings geno­
types of the two parents are uncorrelated (random mating). Given these 
assumptions, the heritability (h
2)o f  earnings is twice the difference be­
tween the earnings correlations of identical and fraternal twins. As the 
difference  between  these  two  correlations  is  0.2  in  the  best  data  sets 
available (the Swedish Twin Registry studied by Anders Bjo ¨ rklund, Mar­
kus Ja ¨ntti, and Gary Solon in chapter 4, and a smaller U.S. Twinsburg 
data set studied by Ashenfelter and Krueger [1994]), these assumptions 
give an estimate of h
2 equal to 0.4. 
Because the correlation of genes for the fraternal twins is 0.5 (due to 
random mating), the implied correlation of fraternal twins’ earnings due 
to genetic factors is h
2/2. The fact that the observed correlation of twins’ 
earnings exceeds this estimate is explained by the fact that twins share 
similar environments. Thus, once we know h
2,w e  can use information 
about the degree of similarity of these environments to estimate how 
large  the environmental effects would have to be to generate the ob­
served earnings correlations. 
The assumptions concerning random mating and common environ­
ments are unrealistic, and can be relaxed. First, we need an estimate of 
my , the correlation of parents’ earnings genotypes. The relevant measure 
is the earnings potential (the correlation of actual earnings would under­
state the degree of assortation, because many women do not work full 
time). The degree of assortation on phenotype is likely to be consider­
ably larger than on genotype for the simple reason that the basis of the 
assortation is the phenotype not the genotype (which is unobservable), 15  INTRODUCTION 
and the two are (for the case of earnings, as we will see) not very closely 
related. Assuming that the genotype for potential earnings of parents is 
half  as  similar  as  are  the  actual  incomes  of  brothers,  the  correlation 
would be about 0.2. 
Second, note that because it was assumed that the environments expe­
rienced by the two identical twins are not, on the average, more similar 
to the environments of the two fraternal twins, the fact that within twin-
pair earnings differences are less for the identical twins must be explained 
entirely by their genetic similarity. But if the identical twins experience 
more similar environments (because they look alike, for example) than 
the fraternals, the estimate will overstate the degree of heritability. 
It is likely that identical twins share more similar environments than 
fraternal twins and other siblings (Loehlin and Nichols 1976; Feldman 
et al. 2000; Cloninger et al. 1979; Rao et al. 1982). Estimates of the 
extent  to  which  identical  twins  environments  are  more  similar  than 
those of fraternal twins are quite imprecise, and we can do no better 
than to indicate the effects of using plausible alternative assumptions. 
Just how sensitive the estimates are to reasonable variations in the as­
sumptions concerning differences in the correlations of twins’ environ­
ments can be estimated by assuming some degree of statistical associa­
tion  of  genes  and  environment,  with  the  correlated  but  not  identical 
genes  of  the  fraternal  twins  giving  them  less  correlated  environments 
than the identical twins. 
Table  I.1  presents  estimates  based  on  various  magnitudes  of  this 
genes-environment effect. As the assumed correlation between genes and 
environment increases, the correlation of the environments of the identi­
cal twins rises, and because this then explains some of the earnings simi­
larity of the identical twins, the resulting estimate of heritability falls. 
The Swedish Twin Registry data set assembled by Bjo ¨rklund, Ja ¨ntti, 
and Solon, analyzed in chapter 4, has data not just on twins, but on 
many pairs with varying degrees of relatedness (half-siblings, for exam­
ple) and may allow for more robust estimates using the methods devel­
oped by Cloninger et al. (1979), Rao et al. (1982), and Feldman et al. 
(2000). 
We take the third numerical column of table I.1 as the most reason­
able set of estimates. Using these, two striking conclusions follow. First, 
the heritability of earnings appears substantial. Second, the environmen­
tal effects are also large. The normalized regression coefﬁcient of envi­
ronment on earnings is βe = 0.38, which may be compared with the nor­
malized regression coefﬁcient for a measure of years of schooling in an 
earnings equation, from our earlier meta-analysis, which is 0.22. Thus, 
these estimates suggest that while educational attainment captures im­
portant aspects of the relevant environments, it is far from exhaustive. 16  INTRODUCTION 
Table I.1

The Effect of the Assumed Correlation of Genes and Environment on

Estimates of the Heritability of Earnings

Assumed Correlation of 
Genes and Environment 
0.00  0.50  0.70  0.80 
Heritability of Earnings  0.50  0.29  0.19  0.13 
Normalized Regression Coefﬁcient: 
Genes on earnings  0.71  0.54  0.44  0.36 
Environment on earnings  0.29  0.33  0.38  0.44 
Correlation of Environments: 
Fraternal twins  0.70  0.70  0.70  0.70 
Identical twins  0.70  0.80  0.90  0.97 
Notes: The association of genes with environment is represented by the normalized re­
gression coefﬁcient of genes on environment. This table assumes that parental earnings-
determining genes are correlated 0.2, and the correlation of fraternal twins’ environment 
is 0.7. We use the correlations of income for identical twins of 0.56 and of fraternal twins 
of 0.36, taken from the U.S. Twinsburg Study, and assume that these are also the correla­
tions of earnings. 
What is the intergenerational correlation of earnings implied by our 
estimate of βe and h?T o  answer this question, in addition to h and βe, we 
require the correlation of parents’ earnings with genes (which is already 
implied by our estimates) and the correlation of parents’ earnings with 
environment. The ﬁrst column in table I.2 gives our estimates. The ge­
netic  contribution  is  simply  h  times  the  correlation  between  parental 
earnings and offspring genotype, or h
2(1 + m)/2. The environmental con­
tribution,  similarly, is  βe  times a  correlation  of  parents’ earnings  and 
Table I.2





Earnings  Income 
Environmental  0.28  0.20 
Genetic  0.12  0.09 
Wealth  0.12 
Intergenerational correlation  0.40  0.41 
Notes: The income column and the estimated contribution of wealth 
are discussed below. The environmental vs. genetic breakdown assumes 
the ﬁgures in the third numerical column in table I.1. 17  INTRODUCTION 
environment  (namely  0.74)  selected  to  yield  a  total  intergenerational 
earnings correlation of 0.4. 
The  estimate  that  genetic  inheritance  may  account  for  almost  one-
third  of  the  intergenerational  correlation  is  somewhat  unexpected,  in 
light of our negative ﬁndings concerning the inheritance of IQ. The sur­
prising importance of both environment and genes points to a puzzle. If 
the genetic contribution is not strongly related to IQ and if the environ­
mental  contribution  is  much  larger  than  the  contribution  of  years  of 
schooling, what are the mechanisms accounting for persistence of in­
come over the generations? We shall return to this puzzle, but will turn 
to data other than twin studies ﬁrst, to show that the same puzzle arises 
elsewhere. 
Human Capital 
Because schooling attainment is persistent across generations and has 
clear links to skills and perhaps other traits that are rewarded in labor 
markets,  an  account  of  the  transmission  of  intergenerational  status 
based on human capital has strong prima facie plausibility. The data 
already introduced allow a calculation of the portion of the intergenera­
tional income correlation accounted for by the more extensive schooling 
received offspring of high-income parents (measured in years). This is 
just  the  correlation  of  parent  income  and  offspring  schooling  (about 
0.45) multiplied by the normalized regression coefﬁcient of schooling in 
an earnings equation (0.22 from our meta-analysis) or 0.10. This is a 
substantial  contribution,  particularly  in  light  of  the  fact  that  it  is  re­
stricted to the effects of years of schooling operating independently of 
IQ (because our estimate of 0.22 is from earnings functions in which 
the regressors include the AFQT test or a similar instrument). The full 
contribution—including the effect of schooling on IQ and its effect on 
earnings, as well as the direct effect of schooling on earnings holding 
constant IQ—is 0.12. 
It  used  to  be  commonly  assumed  that  once  adequate  measures  of 
schooling quality were developed, the only effects of parental economic 
status on offspring earnings would operate through effects on cognitive 
functioning and schooling, and that the direct effect of parental status 
on offspring  earnings would vanish.  But even as the  measurement of 
schooling quality has improved over the years, the estimated direct effect 
of parental incomes (or earnings) on offspring earnings has turned out 
to  be  remarkably  robust.  For  example,  Mulligan  (1999),  using  early 
1990s data from the (U.S.) National Longitudinal Study of Youth, ﬁrst 
estimated the effect of a change in the logarithm of parental earnings on 18  INTRODUCTION 
offspring’s logarithm of earnings without controlling for any other fac­
tors, and then controlled for a large number of measures of school qual­
ity, as  well as  the AFQT and  standard educational  and demographic 
variables. He found that between two-ﬁfths and one-half of the gross 
(unconditional) statistical relationship of parental and offspring earnings 
remains even after controlling for the other factors. 
These results just reafﬁrm the black box puzzle using entirely different 
data and methods: more than half of the intergenerational transmission 
coefﬁcient is unaccounted for.
3 
Taking account of the better health enjoyed by the children of the 
well-to-do than that of poor children (Case et al. 2001), along with the 
fact  that  poor  health  has  substantial  effects  on  incomes  later  in  life 
(Smith 1999), would probably account for a substantial part of the inter-
generational transmission process. The role of health in the process is 
particularly striking because parental incomes appear to have strong im­
pacts on child  health that are not  accounted for by either  the health 
status of the parents nor by the genetic similarity between parents and 
children. Moreover, as John Loehlin shows in chapter 6, while there are 
modest but highly signiﬁcant intergenerational correlations of person­
ality and attitude variables, these correlations are unlikely to account 
for more than a small part of the intergenerational correlation of in­
comes, given our current ability to measure accurately these individual 
characteristics. 
Wealth Effects 
Economic success can be passed on in a family through the inheritance 
of wealth as well as inter vivos wealth transfers to children. Remarkably 
little scholarly attention has been given to this mechanism, in part be­
cause no representative panel data-set with adequate measures of other 
earnings determinants exists, in which the second generation has reached 
the age whereby the inheritance of wealth typically has been completed. 
We are aware of only one study that addresses this problem by following 
the second generation to their deaths, and it estimates a much higher 
intergenerational wealth correlation (Menchik 1979). But while inheri­
tances of wealth clearly matter for the top of the income distribution, 
we doubt whether such transfers play an important role for most fami­
lies. Very few individuals receive inheritances of signiﬁcant magnitude. 
Mulligan (1997) estimates that estates passing on sufﬁcient wealth to be 
subject to inheritance tax in the United States constituted between 2 and 
4 percent  of deaths over  the years  1960–95. Even  though  this ﬁgure 
leaves out quite substantial inheritances as well as transfers that occur 19  INTRODUCTION 
during life, it seems unlikely that for most of the population a substan­
tial degree of economic status is transmitted directly by the intergenera­
tional transfer of property or ﬁnancial wealth. 
It thus seems likely that the intergenerational persistence of wealth 
reﬂects, at least in part, parent-offspring similarities in traits inﬂuencing 
wealth  accumulation,  such  as  orientation  toward  the  future,  sense  of 
personal  efﬁcacy,  work  ethic,  schooling  attainment,  and  risk-taking. 
Some of these traits covary with the level of wealth: for example, less 
well-off people are more likely to be risk averse, to discount the future, 
and to have a low sense of efﬁcacy. Because of this correlation of wealth 
with the traits conducive to wealth accumulation, parent-offspring simi­
larity in wealth may arise from sources independent of any bequests or 
transfers. 
Whatever their source, for families with signiﬁcant income from wealth, 
parent-offspring wealth similarities can contribute a substantial fraction 
to the intergenerational persistence of incomes. Using the same decom­
position methods as described earlier, this contribution is the correlation 
of parent income and child wealth times the normalized regression coef­
ﬁcient of wealth in an income equation. We use data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) analyzed by Charles and Hurst (2003). 
The correlation between parent income and child wealth (both in natu­
ral logarithms) in this data set is 0.24. The average age of the children 
is only thirty-seven years, and so this correlation does not capture inheri­
tance  of  wealth  at  death  of  the  parents.  To  get  a  rough  idea  of  the 
normalized regression coefﬁcient, one way to proceed is by starting with 
the percentage change in income associated with a 1 percent change in 
wealth; this elasticity will range from virtually zero (for those with little 
or no wealth) to one (for those with no source of income other than 
wealth). A plausible mean value (based on average factor income shares) 
for the U.S. population is 0.20. We convert this to a normalized regres­
sion coefﬁcient by multiplying by the ratio of the standard deviation of 
log wealth to the standard deviation of log income, also from the PSID 
data set provided by Charles and Hurst (forthcoming). This calculation 
suggests that higher-income parents’ tendency to have wealthier children 
contributes 0.12 to the intergenerational correlation of incomes. 
This ﬁgure, while substantial, may be an underestimate, as it is based 
on data that, for the reasons already mentioned, does not capture a key 
transmission process, namely inheritance of wealth upon the death of 
one’s parents. Moreover, the estimate should be adjusted upward to take 
account of the tendency for those with greater wealth to have higher 
average returns on their wealth (Bardhan et al. 2000; Yitzhaki 1987). 
Greater parental or personal wealth may also raise the rate of return on 
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account of this empirically. For a sample of very rich parents, the contri­
bution  of  wealth  to  the  intergenerational  correlation  would  be  much 
higher, of course. For a sample of families with very limited wealth, the 
contribution would be nearly zero. The difference in the contribution of 
wealth-effects across the income distribution is a reﬂection of the hetero­
geneous nature of the transmission process mentioned earlier. Because 
of the very skewed distribution of wealth, the family with the mean level 
of wealth (to which our estimates apply) is considerably wealthier than 
the median family. 
Conclusion 
In chapter 3, David Harding, Christopher Jencks, Leonard Lopoo, and 
Susan  Mayer  present  data  showing  that  parent-child  family  income 
correlations fell somewhat between 1961 and 1999, as did the income 
gap  between  nonwhites  and  whites.  Moreover,  they  ﬁnd  that  the  in­
come gap between those raised by advantaged and disadvantaged par­
ents  narrowed  during  the  1960s  but  has  shown  no  trend  since.  This 
moderately egalitarian trend is more promising than recent evidence that 
points to a much higher level of intergenerational transmission of eco­
nomic position than was previously thought to be the case. Our main 
objective in this book has been to assess this historically persistent pro­
cess of intergenerational transmission and the apparently robust mecha­
nisms accounting for it. Table I.3 summarizes our best estimates of the 
Table I.3

The Main Causal Channels of Intergenerational

Status Transmission in the United States

Channel  Earnings  Income 
IQ (conditioned on schooling)  0.05  0.04 
Schooling (conditioned on IQ)  0.10  0.07 
Wealth  0.12 
Personality (fatalism)  0.03  0.02 
Race  0.07  0.07 
Total Intergenerational Correlation  0.25  0.32 
Accounted For 
Notes: For each channel, the entry is the correlation of parent income 
with the indicated predictor of offspring income, multiplied by its normal­
ized regression coefﬁcient in an earnings or income equation. The total is 
the intergenerational correlation resulting from these channels, in the ab­
sence of a direct effect of parents’ status on offspring status. 
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relative importance of the main causal channels we have been able to 
identify. The only entry not previously explained is the ﬁrst, which is an 
estimate of the correlation between parental income and child IQ multi­
plied by our estimate of the normalized effect of IQ on earnings, condi­
tioned on, among other things, years of schooling. The estimates for IQ, 
schooling,  and  personality  in  the  income  column  are  simply  those  in 
the earnings column adjusted to take account of the effect of earnings 
differences on income differences, suitably normalized as described in 
Bowles and Gintis (2002). Thus, we do not take account of the way that 
these earnings determinants may affect the rate of return to one’s wealth. 
By contrast, we assume that the race effect is of the same magnitude in 
determining the returns to both human capital and conventional wealth 
(if the race effect on incomes worked solely via an effect on earnings, 
its contribution to the intergenerational earnings correlation would be 
signiﬁcantly greater). 
While the  estimates  in  table I.3 are  quite imprecise,  the qualitative 
results are not likely to be affected by reasonable alternative methods. 
The  results  are  somewhat  surprising:  wealth,  race,  and  schooling  are 
important to the inheritance of economic status, but IQ is a less impor­
tant contributor and, as we have seen above, the genetic transmission of 
IQ is even less important. 
A policymaker who is concerned about intergenerational transmission 
of economic status will face two difﬁcult sets of issues. First, many of the 
policies that might affect the intergenerational transmission of economic 
status are controversial. Eliminating racial discrimination would reduce 
one component of the heritability of income, but achieving this goal is 
difﬁcult. Improving educational achievement, especially for those whose 
parents have relatively low levels of schooling, would reduce intergener­
ational transmission both directly, because of the impact of schooling, 
and perhaps also indirectly by providing a more open network of group 
memberships and mating choices that are less homogeneous by income 
class. But improving educational achievement is another goal that is eas­
ier stated than accomplished. 
A second broad set of problems is normative. As Adam Swift argues 
in chapter 9, a zero correlation between parental and child incomes is 
not a morally desirable goal because there are important values of family 
life and privacy that would be compromised by any serious attempt to 
disconnect  completely  the  fortunes  of  parents  and  children.  More­
over, as dramatized by Marcus Feldman, Shuzhuo Li, Nan Li, Shripad 
Tuljapurkar, and Xiaoyi Jin in chapter 8, parental self-interest as well 
as parental altruism leads families to maintain a strong and culturally 
justiﬁed interest in the economic futures of their children. Thus, rather 
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zero  intergenerational  correlation,  a  better  approach  might  be  to  ask 
which mechanisms of intergenerational transmission are unfair, and to 
direct policies accordingly. The role of race in transmitting status from 
generation to generation is clearly unfair. Many people regard the strong 
correlation between parental income and child health as morally suspect, 
and many feel the same way about high levels of wealth inheritance. 
Large majorities favor policies to compensate for inherited disabilities. 
Other mechanisms of persistence—the genetic inheritance of good looks, 
for example—strike most people as unobjectionable and not an appro­
priate target for compensatory policy interventions. Even if some con­
sensus could be formed on which of these mechanisms are morally sus­
pect, the policy implications would be far from clear. For example, the 
possible incentive effects on parental behaviors of reduced parental in­
ﬂuence on child success would have to be estimated and considered. 
Addressing  the  policy  challenge  will  require  not  only  moral  clarity 
about these and related issues, but a better accounting of which causal 
mechanisms are at work in producing the substantial levels of intergen­
erational persistence of economic differences. We hope the research pre­
sented in this book will contribute to a renewed commitment to dealing 
with this pressing social issue. 
Notes 
1.  The analysis presented below is drawn from Bowles and Gintis (2002). 
2.  This decomposition can be found in Blalock (1964) and is described in the 
Appendix in Bowles and Gintis (2002). Goldberger (1991) describes the stan­
dard  regression  model  with  normalized  (mean  zero,  unit  standard  deviation) 
variables on which it is based. 
3.  It is also true that we can usually account statistically for less than half of 
the  variance  of  the  earnings  or  income  using  the  conventional  variables  de­
scribed earlier. But this fact does not explain our limited success in accounting 
for the intergenerational correlation, as this correlation measures only that part 
of the variation of earnings that we can explain statistically by parental eco­
nomic status. 